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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Given the near-identical arguments made by the United States and the Tribe, the State has

prepared this single brief to be filed in response to the appeals of both the United States (Docket
No. 45382) and the Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Docket No. 45383) from the district court’s Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 4310), Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use (R. 4301)
and Final Order Disallowing Water Right Claims (R. 4305), as modified in the Amended Final
Order Disallowing Water Right Claims (R. 4468), Order on Motion to Set Aside and Modify (R.
4479), and Order Granting Motion to Reconsider (R. 4473).
The State, in its related appeal (Docket No. 45381), asserts that the district court should
have disallowed all claims other than claims for irrigation, domestic, and municipal purposes.
Consistent with that position, the State responds in these appeals that while the district court did
not go far enough in disallowing claims, it did not err in disallowing the claims for offreservation instream flows; the claims for commercial and industrial uses; the claim for
maintenance of lake levels in Coeur d’Alene Lake; and the claims of non-consumptive water
rights to wetlands, springs, and seeps for purposes of gathering, traditional, cultural, spiritual,
ceremonial, and/or religious uses, all of which the United States and the Tribe assert as falling
within the “homeland” purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
B.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The briefs of the United States and the Tribe make repeated references to the “1873

Agreement” negotiated between federal representatives and the Tribe, often implying that its
provisions are in place and enforceable. See, e.g., Tribe’s Brief at 9 (“[t]he 1873 Agreement . . .
expressly protects the Tribe’s water resources”). The 1873 Agreement, however, was never
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ratified, in part because the federal representatives who negotiated the Agreement later
repudiated it and questioned whether they had authority to negotiate with the Tribe. R. 2989.
In the litigation over ownership of submerged lands underlying Coeur d’Alene Lake, the
federal district court found that the 1873 Agreement helped explain the rationale for the
boundaries employed in the 1873 Executive Order, which, as the court found, "mirrored exactly
the legal boundaries delineated in the 1873 agreement." United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d
1094, 1096 (D. Idaho 1998). While the court later stated that “an object of the Executive Order
was, in part, to create a reservation for the Coeur d’Alenes that mirrored the terms of the 1873
Agreement,” id. at 1109, it meant nothing more than that the boundaries in the Agreement and
the Executive Order are identical: no other terms from the Agreement are “mirrored” in the
Order. Indeed, they could not be, for the President was barred from unilaterally implementing
the Agreement through executive order. After Congress forbid treaty-making with Indian tribes
in the Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, "relations with Indians were governed by Acts of
Congress . . . including legislating the ratification of contracts of the Executive Branch with
Indian tribes . . . .'' Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975). Absent ratification, the
1873 Agreement was null and void, a fact recognized in the Agreement itself. R. 1866. See also
Robinson v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2015) (treaty with tribe that was “never ratified
by the Senate . . . carries no legal effect”).
The State also disagrees with the assertion that the “full quantity of water claimed has a
limited scope,” U.S. Brief at 1, an assertion backed by reference to the fact that the United
States’ consumptive use claims amount to less than one percent of the total outflow of the Coeur
d’Alene-Spokane River Basin. U.S. Brief at 1; Tribe’s Brief at 16. Such assertions omit the
impact of the instream flows claimed in 72 stream reaches and the claim to maintain the “natural
monthly Lake elevations and outflows” of Coeur d’Alene Lake. R. 0011. The scope and impact
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of the Lake claim cannot be understated; by necessity, a claim to maintain “natural Lake
elevations and outflows” (R. 0011) leaves little to no water available for appropriation by other
water users within the Basin. The latter fact is of critical importance: the Supreme Court has
cited its reserved water rights decisions of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), and
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), as support for the proposition that neither Indians
nor non-Indians can deprive the other of a “fair share” of a resource used by both. Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 684 (1979); see
also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 176 (1977) (tribe could not exercise
fishing right so as to “interdict completely the migrating fish run” and frustrate the rights of nonIndian citizens to the resource).

II.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE CLAIM THAT WATER WAS RESERVED
FOR ALL PURPOSES ASSOCIATED WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF A “HOMELAND.”
The United States and the Tribe (together, “Claimants”) assert that water for the Coeur

d’Alene Indian Reservation was reserved for every conceivable purpose, including irrigated
agriculture; domestic, commercial, municipal, and industrial (“DCMI”); fish and wildlife habitat;
fish propagation; lake level maintenance; water storage; power generation; religious, cultural,
and ceremonial; transportation; stockwater and wildlife; aesthetics; and recreation. See, e.g., R.
5576 (Claim No. 95-16672). Unsurprisingly, the district court concluded that in the Claimants’
minds, this is a reservation with no secondary purposes. R. 4319. Indeed, the Claimants
embrace this finding by arguing that, on Indian reservations, the distinction between primary and
secondary purposes does not apply, and water is reserved for every conceivable purpose that falls
under the rubric of “homeland.”
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1. The Claimants’ assertion that Indian reservations are set aside as “homelands” simply
states a tautology: the term "homeland" means "a state or area set aside to be a state for a people
of a particular national cultural, or racial origin." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 554
(10th ed. 1996). The term "reservation" means "[a] tract of public land set aside for a special
purpose; esp., a tract of land set aside for use by an Indian tribe." Black's Law Dictionary 1309
(7th ed. 1999). To argue that water is reserved for all “homeland” purposes is to argue that water
is reserved for all “reservation” purposes, a position at odds with the very nature of the impliedreservation-of-water doctrine. “Because the doctrine is one of implication, the United States
Supreme Court has traditionally applied it very narrowly.” Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134
Idaho 916, 926, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270 (2000) (Trout, J., concurring). It is no coincidence that the
only purpose that the Supreme Court has confirmed for Indian reservations is irrigation—nor can
such limitation be explained by asserting, as does the United States, that the Court’s “decisions
addressed water for irrigation because that was the question presented in those cases.” U.S. Brief
at 14. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Court, employing a special master, was
asked to determine “the full extent of the water rights created by the United States” for five
Indian reservations. R. 2235 (special master’s report) (emphasis added). Ultimately, the court
held that the full extent of water rights was properly measured by reference to the amount of
practicably irrigable acreage reserved for each tribe, despite recognizing that water was also
“essential . . . to the animals they hunted.” 373 U.S. at 599.
The Court’s recognition of a singular, primary purpose for the five reservations in
Arizona v. California reflects its view that the implied-reservation-of water doctrine is to be
applied narrowly:
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal
reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress'
express deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended
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to reserve the necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary use
of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress
intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire
water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
While the United States labors to portray New Mexico as applying only to “later-defined”
uses on national forest lands, the New Mexico decision itself belies such claim, for the Court was
not crafting a new test for reserved water rights on national forests, but merely gleaning a
principle from its earlier decisions. Citing its prior holdings addressing Indian reservations, id. at
700 n.4, 1 the Court held that “[e]ach time this Court has applied the ‘implied-reservation-ofwater doctrine,’ it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes
for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the
reservation would be entirely defeated.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
Because the primary/secondary purposes doctrine was derived, in large part, from the
Supreme Court’s decisions addressing Indian reservations, there is no basis for concluding that
the Court intended to limit its application to reservations of non-Indian lands. The lower federal
courts have not done so—while generally prefacing their application of New Mexico with the
caution that it does not apply “directly” to Indian reservations, see, e.g., United States v Adair,
723 F.2d 1394, 1408 (9th Cir. 1983), the lower federal courts have generally followed New
Mexico’s admonition to look solely to a reservation’s primary purposes when implying water
rights. Adair, citing New Mexico, held that “the scope of the implied right is circumscribed by
the necessity that calls for its creation,” and implied water rights only for primary purposes of the
Klamath Reservation, not for secondary uses. Id. at 1408-09. In Colville Confederated Tribes v.

1

Discussing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); 1908); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963); and Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), the court, stating “[w]e apply the New Mexico test here,”
found that the primary purpose test is met if the reservation would be “valueless without water”
(id. at 46, citing Winters, 207 U.S. at 576), or if water was “essential to the life of the Indian
people.” Id., quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 599.
In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d
1262 (9th Cir. 2017), the court again found that the New Mexico primary/secondary distinction
provides “guidelines” for determining tribal water rights, id. at 1269 n.6, and stated that
“[b]ecause New Mexico holds that water is reserved if the primary purpose of the reservation
envisions water use, we now determine the primary purpose of the Tribe's reservation and
whether that purpose contemplates water use.” See id. at 1270 (describing purpose as “to
establish a home and support an agrarian society”). Likewise, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in
determining reserved water rights for the Wind River Indian Reservation, applied the “rigorous
analysis called for by United States v. New Mexico.” In re the General Adjudication of All
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 90 (Wyo. 1988). 2 The
Wyoming court found that the primary purposes of the Reservation were defined by those onreservation activities that were actively encouraged by treaty, rather than merely contemplated or
permitted:
Although the treaty did not force the Indians to become farmers and although it
clearly contemplates that other activities would be permitted (hunting is
mentioned in Article 4, lumbering and milling in Article 3, roaming in Article 9),
the treaty encouraged only agriculture, and that was its primary purpose.
Id.

2

In Vaughn v. State, 963 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998), the court abrogated that portion of the
Big Horn decision employing an abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the district
court properly admitted engineering feasibility testimony used to determine practicably irrigable
acreage, but otherwise left the decision intact.
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Given the wealth of precedent applying New Mexico to Indian reservations, the district
court did not err in distinguishing between primary and secondary purposes in determining the
Tribe’s entitlement to reserved water rights. Likewise, this Court must reject the assertion that
the New Mexico Court, by finding that later-added purposes for federal reservation are not
primary purposes, necessarily concluded that any original purpose, whether express or implied,
is a primary purpose. U.S. Brief at 17-18. If anything, the New Mexico decision establishes that
only purposes clearly expressed by Congress at the creation of the reservation are primary
purposes. In determining the primary purposes of a national forest reservation, the Court stopped
at the plain language of the act creating the national forests, 438 U.S. at 707-08, and rejected the
United States’ assertion that an additional, generalized purpose to “improve and protect” national
forests could be implied from the wording of the act. Id. at 707 n.14.
2. Not only do the Claimants seek to limit application of New Mexico’s
primary/secondary purposes test: they seek to avoid any further inquiry into the Reservation’s
purposes once it is established that the Reservation was to serve as a “homeland” for the Tribe.
The only court to actually apply the Claimant’s “homeland” theory of water rights is the Arizona
Supreme Court in In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
System, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila River V). 3 In Gila River V, the Arizona Supreme Court
3

The Claimants’ citation of Montana ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 712 P.2d 754 (Mont. 1985), as a case implying “homeland” water rights is misplaced.
While the Greely Court appeared to distinguish New Mexico, it was not adjudicating reserved
water right claims: the only issue it considered was whether “the Montana Water Use Act [is]
adequate to adjudicate reserved water rights.” 712 P.2d at 762. In conjunction with such
question, the court surveyed the case law that described the potential scope of reserved water
right claims that could potentially be presented in a future case. Id. at 762-65. Such dicta
establishes no precedent. Montana Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1287
(Mont. 1982) (“[t]his Court is not bound to give precedential value to dicta”). And in fact, the
Greely court did not recognize reserved water rights for a broad range of uses, but found
authority only for reserved water rights to support agriculture and for fishing and hunting. 712
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rejected the parties’ proffered historical analyses of the reservation’s purposes, instead holding,
as a matter of law, “that the purpose of a federal Indian reservation is to serve as a ‘permanent
home and abiding place’ to the Native American people living there.” Id. at 76 (quoting Winters,
207 U.S. at 565). In doing so, the Court rejected a prior decision stating that determination of
purpose required “fact-intensive inquiries that must be made on a case-by-case basis,” and
replaced it with the court’s legal finding “that Indian reservations were created as permanent
homelands.” Id. at 76 n.5 (citing In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in
the Gila River System, 989 P.2d 739, 748 (Ariz. 1999)).
The Gila River V holding, however, stands on infirm foundations, and is inconsistent with
this Court’s precedents and that of most jurisdictions. First, the court concluded that “historical
reality is irrelevant for purposes of establishing reserved rights,” because intent to reserve water
rights is “merely imputed” rather than expressed. Id. at 75 (quoting Martha C. Franks, The Uses
of the Practicably Irrigable Acreage Standard in the Quantification of Reserved Water Rights,
31 Nat. Res. J. 549, 563 (1991)). Ignoring historical evidence of intent, however, is at odds with
this Court’s determination that “[w]hether there has been a federal reservation of water, and the
quantity of water reserved, are questions of legislative intent.” Potlatch Corp., 134 Idaho at 914,
12 P.3d at 1258. In practice, historical examination into the specific purposes of a reservation
often yields valuable information regarding the parties’ intent. Cf. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409-10
(examining treaty, negotiations, and related documents to determine the purposes “which the
parties to the 1864 Treaty intended the Klamath Reservation to serve”); Big Horn, 753 P.2d at
97-98 (employing historical examination to determine what activities the treaty encouraged,

P.2d at 764. The court found no “decisive federal cases” implying water rights to support
industrial purposes, id. at 765, and concluded only that “[i]t may be that such ‘acts of
civilization’ will include consumptive uses for industrial purposes.” Id.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO
DOCKET NO. 45383-2017

Page 8

rather than merely permitted); Winters, 207 U.S. at 575 (intent to reserve water “turns on the
agreement” creating reservation).
Secondly, the Gila River V court erred in determining that New Mexico’s admonition that
reserved water rights must be “narrowly quantified to meet the original, primary purpose of the
reservation,” applies only to “non-Indian reservations.” Gila River V, 35 P.3d at 73. As
discussed supra, the Supreme Court’s limitation of reserved water rights to those necessary to
fulfill the “specific purposes” of a reservation was constructed on the foundation of the Court’s
prior decisions addressing water rights for Indian reservations; the Arizona court erred in simply
casting it aside.
Third, the Gila River V court erred in citing a need for “flexibility” in implying the scope
of reserved water rights, given its belief that “an across-the-board application of PIA [has the]
potential for inequitable treatment of tribes based solely on geographical location.” Id. at 78.
The court’s concern about the perceived inflexibility of the PIA standard is at odds with the
Supreme Court’s reasons for adopting the practicably irrigable acreage standard, which the Court
has described as “in part attributable to the Court's interest in a fixed calculation of future water
needs.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 617 (1983) (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court’s use of PIA as the measure of reserved water rights is grounded in
the principle that the quantity of water reserved is dependent on the uses of land contemplated in
the document creating the reservation, not on future uses of water not tied specifically to the
productivity of reserved land. See id. (“[t]he practicably irrigable acreage standard was
preferable because how many Indians there will be and what their future needs will be could
‘only be guessed’”) (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601). Limiting the reservation of
water rights to the primary purposes of reserved land, however, does not limit the use of such
water for other purposes as a tribe’s economy develops—such flexibility was incorporated into
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the PIA standard by the Special Master in Arizona v. California, who held that while
“reservations of water were made for the purpose of enabling the Indians to develop a viable
agricultural economy” that does not mean that “water reserved for Indian Reservations cannot be
used for purposes other than agricultural and related uses.” R. 2235 (Special Master’s Report at
265). In a follow-up per curiam opinion, the Court held that the “quantity of water necessary to
supply consumptive use required for irrigation . . . shall constitute the means of determining
quantity of adjudicated water rights but shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of them to
irrigation or other agricultural application.” Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979). In
Walton, the court held that allowing flexibility in the usage of water initially reserved for
irrigation met the general purpose of “providing a homeland for the survival and growth of the
Indians and their way of life.” 647 F.2d at 49. In other words, concerns about flexibility are
addressed by recognizing that uses of reserved water rights may change over time, not by
implying the reservation of additional water for such uses.
Finally, the Gila River V court erred in its belief that treaties must be interpreted to avoid
inequitable outcomes. 35 P.3d at 78. By interpreting a treaty flexibly in order to avoid results
the court viewed as inequitable, the Arizona court violated the Supreme Court’s admonishment
that courts are not “at liberty to dispense with any of the conditions or requirements of the treaty,
or to take away any qualification or integral part of any stipulation, upon any notion of equity or
general convenience, or substantial justice.” United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 533
(1900); see also United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 650 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court may not
employ “equitable considerations in interpreting Indian treaties”) (emphasis in original).
In sum, the “homeland” theory propounded by the Arizona Supreme Court in Gila River
V was not well-founded because it failed to recognize that fulfillment of the general “homeland”
purpose of providing means for future economic development does not require that consumptive
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water rights be quantified for every conceivable future use whether or not such use was a
primary purpose at the time of reservation. Rather, establishment of agriculture as the primary
purpose of a reservation recognizes that as a tribe’s economy evolves, farms may be converted to
commercial or industrial uses, and water earlier used for irrigation may be turned to such uses.
See Walton, 647 F.2d at 47 n.9 (“Congress envisioned agricultural pursuits as only a first step in
the ‘civilizing’ process”). Here, the district court correctly determined that intent to reserve
water should be determined by engaging in an analysis of the purposes which the United States
and the Tribe “intended the . . . Reservation] to serve”). Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410. While the
State asserts, in its appeal, that not all purposes of the 1873 Executive Order survived
subsequent, superseding legislation, the district court nonetheless correctly determined that any
purpose other than agriculture, hunting, and fishing was not a primary purpose of the 1873
Executive Order. The district court’s holding does not foreclose the use of reserved water for the
myriad of purposes sought by the Tribe, with the caveat that non-consumptive water rights may
only be used for other, non-consumptive purposes. See Adair, 723 at 1411 (holder of nonconsumptive reserved instream flow water right “is not entitled to withdraw water from the
stream for agricultural, industrial, or other consumptive uses”).
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISALLOWED CLAIMS FOR COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES.
The district court denied all claims of water rights for commercial and industrial

purposes, other than a claim for a fish hatchery—presumably the latter claim was allowed as
consistent with court’s determination that a primary purpose of the Reservation was hunting and
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fishing. 4 The district court’s denial of water rights for commercial and industrial purposes is
well-supported.
In Winters, the United States claimed that water was necessary to achieve the purposes of
“furthering and advancing the civilization and improvement of the Indians, and to encourage
habits of industry and thrift among them.” 207 U.S. at 567. The Supreme Court agreed that
water could be “turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization,” but did not suggest that “arts of
civilization” would be the basis for a separate water right entitlement. Id. Since Winters, courts
have noted the lack of “decisive federal cases on the extent of Indian water rights for uses
classed as ‘acts [sic] of civilization.’” Montana ex rel. Greely, 712 P.2d at 765 (but noting
possibility that acts of civilization may include water for industrial purposes).
Any assertion that water was reserved by the 1873 Executive Order to encourage “arts of
civilization” must be construed in the context of the times. In the nineteenth century, federal
agents believed that “civilization” of tribes was to be achieved not through commercial or
industrial activities, but through farming. In 1889 General Benjamin Simpson opened
negotiations with the Tribe by stating that “[t]he time is come when you, like the whites, should
depend upon the cultivation of the soil . . . . We know that cultivation of the soil is the very
foundation of civilization, prosperity, and wealth.” R. 2114. When the Commission of Indian

4

Below, the State did not contest claims for power generation and fire suppression
because the State asserted that the current reservation was created by the Act of March 3, 1891,
which anticipated tribal reliance primarily on farming and agriculturally-related industries, thus
superseding the Executive Order of November 8, 1873. If, however, the Reservation was created
by the 1873 Executive Order, then the United States is correct in asserting that purposes added
by later acts are, by their very nature, secondary. See U.S. Brief at 15-16 (“[New Mexico]
requires only that the federal reservation of water rights be tied to the original purposes of the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation; any later-defined purposes of the reservation would have to be
assessed to determine whether they were merely “secondary” uses that are not entitled to
federally-reserved water rights”).
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Affairs reported in 1889 that the Tribe was “far advanced in civilization,” he cited their extensive
cultivation of the soil as support for such statement. R. 2110.
In Arizona v. California, the Court applied the Special Master’s Report that specifically
rejected a separate claim of reserved water rights for industrial purposes, instead recognizing that
water initially reserved for irrigation could be later converted to such use:
The amount of water reserved for the five Reservations, and the water rights
created thereby, are measured by the water needed for agricultural, stock and
related domestic purposes. The reservations of water were made for the purpose
of enabling the Indians to develop a viable agricultural economy; other uses, such
as those for industry, which might consume substantially more water than
agricultural uses, were not contemplated at the time the Reservations were
created. Indeed, the United States asks only for enough water to satisfy future
agricultural and related uses. This does not necessarily mean, however, that water
reserved for Indian Reservations cannot be used for purposes other than
agricultural and related uses.
R. 2235 (Special Master’s Report at 265).
Likewise, in Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrig. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash.
1993), the appellate court upheld the trial court’s holding that the:
The Yakima Indian Nation's diversions of water (over and above the amount
listed [for irrigation purposes]) for commercial, industrial and other
nonagricultural purposes are not in fulfillment of the primary purposes of the
treaty and therefore are limited to those quantities of water that may be
established pursuant to state law.
Id. at 1310.
To the State’s knowledge, the only case affirming a reserved water right for an
“industrial” purpose is In re Crow Water Compact, 364 P.3d 584 (Mont. 2016), in which the
court was considering objections that a water rights compact allocating water to the Crow Tribe
to support coal mining was “for an improper purpose.” Id. at 589. The court determined:
[U]nder Winters and its progeny the tribe has a right to water for development of
industrial interests. The Tribe's interests in the Ceded Strip are primarily mineral
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deposits (coal) that may be developed for industrial purposes. The allocation of
water in the Ceded Strip reflects the opportunity to do that for the Tribe.
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the compact was negotiated at arm’s length and
in good faith and therefore “presumptively valid” absent a showing that “the Compact is
unreasonable and that [the objectors’] interests are materially injured.” Id. at 587-88. With
regard to the water right for industrial purposes, the court found such standards met, in part
because of a provision that the “Tribal Water Right cannot be exercised ahead of pre-1999 statelaw rights.” Id. at 588. Because the court was approving a water rights compact, the decision
has limited precedential value.
Here, the sole historical evidence offered by the Claimants in support of the assertion that
industrial uses were a primary purpose of the 1873 Reservation is the fact that the unratified
1873 Agreement would have furnished the Tribe with a “grist and saw mill combined” to be
located at the “Upper Falls” (i.e., Post Falls). Tribe’s Brief at 37 (citing R. 1866). The district
court concluded that such a mill did not establish an independent, “industrial” purpose, but rather
was one of “various implements [that] would be conveyed from the United States to the Tribe to
promote [an] agricultural lifestyle.” R. 4320. The court’s conclusion is well supported not only
by the terms of the unratified agreement, but by the fact that in other adjudications, similar
provisions for mills have not led courts to imply the reservation of water for industrial and
commercial purposes. In the Big Horn Adjudication, the court noted that the treaty creating the
Wind River Reservation provided for a saw mill with attached grist mill, 753 P.2d at 95, but
concluded that the “district court did not err in denying a reserved water right for mineral and
industrial uses.” Id. at 98. In Adair, the Treaty with the Klamath Indians, 16 Stat. 707, called for
the erection of a saw mill and flouring mill, but the court found that the primary purposes of the
Reservation were limited to agriculture, hunting, fishing, and gathering. 723 F.2d at 1410.
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Likewise, in Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrig. Dist. (discussed supra), the court
upheld the denial of water rights for “commercial, industrial and other nonagricultural purposes,”
850 P.2d at 1310, yet the Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951, called for the construction of
“one saw-mill and one flouring-mill” and the erection of an “agricultural and industrial school.”
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT GATHERING AND OTHER TRADITIONAL
USES OF WATERWAYS WERE NOT PRIMARY PURPOSES OF THE COEUR D’ALENE
RESERVATION.
Gathering of water-dependent plants was part of the Tribe’s traditional subsistence

practices, and the Tribe used waterways for travel and for religious and cultural purposes. But
the fact that a use of water was of “historical importance” does not mean such use is
automatically deemed a primary purpose of the Reservation—if such were the test, the primary
purposes doctrine would be of limited utility. The Wyoming Supreme Court, in adjudicating
water rights for the Wind River Reservation, found that uses of historical importance, such as
hunting, were not primary purposes of the reservation if merely permitted by treaty terms, rather
than encouraged. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 97. Likewise, in Adair, the only case to recognize a
reserved water right for gathering, the court based its decision on the “historical importance” of
traditional subsistence activities “and the language of Article I of the 1864 Treaty,” which
specifically reserved gathering rights within the reservation. 723 F.2d at 1409 (emphasis added).
Here, there is no treaty or agreement expressly reserving gathering rights, or indeed, any
subsistence rights at all, and the contemporary historical evidence relating to establishment of the
1873 Reservation that addresses reliance on traditional subsistence activities mentions only
hunting and fishing. See R. 4322 (discussing 1872 tribal petition and letter from government
surveyor). On appeal, the Claimants do not identify any contemporaneous evidence that
preservation of gathering opportunities was a primary purpose of the 1873 Executive Order: they
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rely instead on modern day expert analysis of the Tribe’s subsistence practices. 5 Given the lack
of contemporaneous evidence encouraging or expressly preserving gathering, transportation,
cultural, and religious rights, the district court correctly concluded that such traditional uses,
while admittedly permitted, were not primary purposes of the Reservation.
D.

MAINTENANCE OF COEUR D’ALENE LAKE AT SPECIFIC ELEVATIONS IS NOT
NECESSARY TO FULFILL THE PRIMARY PURPOSES OF THE RESERVATION.
In accordance with its “homeland” theory of water rights, the United States claimed the

right to maintain Coeur d’Alene Lake at specified lake levels throughout the year for a “myriad
of tribal uses,” including “food; fiber; transportation; recreation; religious, cultural and
ceremonial; fish and wildlife habitat; lake level and wetland maintenance; water storage; power
generation; and aesthetics.” R. 0011. “[T]the intent [was] to claim sufficient water to reflect the
natural Lake processes prior to Post Falls dam.” R. 0011. The district court disallowed the claim
because “[l]ake level maintenance is not a primary purpose of the reservation,” referring back to
its dismissal of “homeland” purposes as providing the reason for such conclusion. R. 4328.
Additionally, the court held that the “outflow component of the claim,” which would have
established minimum stream flows below Post Falls Dam, “seeks to develop a place of use
outside the boundaries of the reservation.” R. 4328. In its Final Order Disallowing Purposes of
Use, the district court ordered that the claim “proceed to the quantification phase of this litigation
on its ‘fish and wildlife’ purpose of use.” R. 4302.
As discussed in the section of this brief addressing “homeland” claims, the district court
acted in accordance with the law in rejecting the “myriad” of claimed purposes of the Lake, and
5

The United States points to one instance in the record of a historical document relating
to the Tribe that mentions “berries and roots,” U.S. Brief at 24, but the letter (R. 696) was
discussing resources on the small reservation set apart by the Executive Order of June 14, 1867,
which was superseded by the 1873 Executive Order.
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in limiting the claim to what the court concluded were the primary purposes of the Reservation.
In its appeal (Docket No. 45381), the State asserts that, in light of the Reservation’s history
subsequent to 1873, “fish and wildlife” is a secondary purpose of the Reservation. Here, solely
for purposes of argument, the State will assume the district court correctly determined that “fish
and wildlife” is a primary purpose of the Reservation. Even in the light of such assumption, the
district court’s denial of a claim for “lake level maintenance” must be upheld because the actions
of the United States and the Tribe decry any assertion that maintenance of Coeur d’Alene Lake at
“natural levels” is necessary to achieve the primary purposes of the Reservation. See United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 699 (“the Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress
reserved ‘only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no
more’”) (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976)).
First, a series of actions subsequent to the 1873 Executive Order demonstrate
conclusively that the parties did not understand the Reservation’s purposes to require
maintenance of lake levels. In 1888, Congress initiated an inquiry into whether the Reservation
boundaries should be redrawn to exclude the Lake, or substantial portions thereof, from the
Reservation. An 1886 resolution crafted by Oregon Senator John Mitchell stated, in part, that
“Lake Coeur D’Alene, all the navigable waters of Coeur D’Alene River, and about 20 miles of
the navigable part of Saint Joseph River . . . [are alleged to be] the most important highways of
commerce in the Territory of Idaho,” and expressed concern that “all boats now entering such
waters are subject to the laws governing the Indian country and all persons going on such lake or
waters within the Reservation line are trespassers.” R. 2055. The Resolution directed the
Secretary of the Interior to report “whether it is advisable to release any of the navigable waters
aforesaid from the limits of such reservation.” Id. In response to the Resolution, the Secretary of
the Interior submitted to the Senate a letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs concluding
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that “the release of some or all of the navigable waters therefrom . . . would be of very great
benefit to the public.” R. 2057, 2058 (Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 76 (1888)).
Congress subsequently authorized negotiations, whose “main purpose . . . was to regain
from the Tribe whatever submerged lands it was willing to sell.” United States v. Idaho, 210
F.3d 1067, 1077 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000). In the new agreement, concluded September 9, 1889, the
parties agreed to “split the lake—a fact recognized in the legal descriptions of the cession, the
verbal explanation given to the Tribe, and the maps submitted to Congress.” Id. at 1075. The
1889 agreement, in the words of the Supreme Court, “cede[d] the northern portion of the
reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene, in exchange for
$500,000.” Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 269-70 (2001). While two-thirds is a rough
estimate of the cession measured by length, the cession, when measured by area, excluded more
than 80 percent of the Lake from the Reservation. 6
The “purposeful division of the Lake,” 210 F.3d at 1075, with less then 1/5 of the Lake
remaining within the Reservation, belies the Claimants’ assertions of a lake level maintenance
right. If the primary purposes of the Reservation required maintenance of lake levels, then the
subsequent exclusion of most of the Lake from the Reservation was at odds with such purpose,
for implicit in such cession is loss of control over lake elevations. When a water body has split
ownership, one party cannot claim the unilateral right to maintain a specific lake elevation,
because such right, if recognized, necessarily imposes a lake elevation upon all owners of the
water body. 7 This is especially true given the Tribe’s assertion that “[a] right to lake level and
6

R. 548 (Affidavit of David Shaw, ¶ 8, determining that “about 15.5% of the Lake is
within the Reservation and about 84.5% is outside of the Reservation”); see also R., p. 2810
(denying motion to strike the above-cited portion of Mr. Shaw’s Affidavit).
7
The Tribe (unsupported by the United States) claims ownership of the entirety of Coeur
d’Alene Lake, but under the law, this Court must presume state ownership of those portions of
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wetland maintenance . . . is part and parcel of the Tribe’s sovereign ownership and control of
submerged lands.” Tribe’s Brief at 43. The Supreme Court has held that when there are
competing sovereign interests on a single waterbody, the solution is not to award one sovereign
the right to impose its will on the other: the solution is a “just and equitable” apportionment of
water rights made after a “delicate adjustment of [all] interests.” Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176, 183 (1982); see also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 684 (citing Winters and Arizona v. California to support holding that
neither Indians nor non-Indians can deprive the other of a “fair share” of a shared resource).
While the State does not suggest that the CSRBA district court has jurisdiction to conduct
an equitable apportionment of the Lake between the State and Tribe, the principles that underlie
such doctrine caution against implying, in the face of the cession of over 80% of the Lake,
retention of the right to dictate lake elevations throughout the Lake. The district court correctly
denied the claim for lake level maintenance, and limited any claim to the Lake to the purposes of
hunting and fishing, which presumably would be measured by the volume of water in the Tribe’s
portion of the Lake necessary to fulfill such purposes. See Idaho Code § 42-1409(1)(c)(ii) (nonconsumptive federal reserved water rights to be described by “the rate of flow in cubic feet per
second or annual volume of present and future diversion in acre feet per year”).
Likewise, the district court recognized that the United States could not claim the right to
maintain a specified outflow from the Lake, as measured below Post Falls Dam, which the
United States claims is “necessary to keep the lake from becoming a stagnant pool.” U.S. Brief
at 19 n.9. As the district court correctly noted, the claimed outflow is well outside the

the Lake not decreed to the Tribe. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 78 (2006) (“States enjoy
a presumption of title to submerged lands beneath inland navigable waters within their
boundaries”).
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boundaries of the Reservation, and the place of use was explicitly ceded by the Tribe, an action
at odds with the assertion that the purposes of the Reservation required maintenance of the
outflow. Indeed, the Tribe not only ceded the Spokane River and Post Falls by means of general
and comprehensive cession language, it insisted that the United States confirm its earlier cession
of Post Falls to Frederick Post for water power purposes by including the following statement by
Coeur d’Alene chief Andrew Seltice in the Act of March 3, 1891:
Know all men by these presents that I, Andrew Seltice chief of the Coeur d’Alene
Indians, did on the first day of June, A. D. eighteen hundred and seventy-one,
with the consent of my people, when the country on both sides of the Spokane
River belonged to me and my people, for a valuable consideration sell to
Frederick Post the place now known as Post Falls, in Kootenai County, Idaho, to
improve and use the same (water-power); said sale included all three of the river
channels and islands, with enough land on the north and south shores for waterpower and improvements . . . .
Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. at 1031-32. Congress directed that Post Falls be surveyed and
patented to Frederick Post. Id. at 1031.
Given the purposeful division of the Lake, the Tribe’s retention of only a small portion
thereof, and the Tribe’s insistence on conveying the outlet of the Lake to Frederick Post for
“water-power and improvements,” it is not possible to imply intent to reserve a “natural lake
processes” water right either in the Lake itself or at Post Falls.
Actions subsequent to the 1891 cession confirm that the parties did not understand
maintenance of the Lake’s “natural processes” to be necessary to the primary purposes of the
Reservation. The first such action is the Department of the Interior’s issuance, in 1909, of a
permit to Washington Water Power Company allowing the Company to overflow Reservation
lands as a consequence of the construction of dams at Post Falls. See R. 1767-82 (report of Tribe
expert E. Richard Hart discussing permit); R. 3038 (report of State expert Stephen Wee
discussing permit). The dams at Post Falls retard drainage of the Lake so that it remains at
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higher elevations for longer periods of the year. R. 0876 (1921 hydrologic report). The Tribe
received $1.25 per acre for water storage on its portion of the lakebed and adjacent lands. R.
3038.
The Government’s 1909 issuance of a permit on behalf of the Tribe allowing alternation
of the Lake’s natural flow regime is difficult to reconcile with its current assertion that the parties
understood a natural flow regime to be essential to fulfill the primary purposes of the
Reservation. Even more difficult to reconcile is the United States’ acknowledgment that current
operations at Post Falls Dam, which significantly alter the natural hydrologic regime, are
consistent with the purposes of the Reservation. Such acknowledgment appears on the face of
the lake level maintenance claim, in which the United States admits that the claim is not
currently necessary to achieve the purposes of the Reservation because it “does not seek to affect
present licensed operations at Post Falls.” R. 6279 (Notice of Claim No. 95-16704). The current
license does not expire until 2059. Order Issuing New License and Approving Annual Charges
for the Use of Reservation Lands, 127 FERC ¶ 61,265, 62,187 (June 18, 2009).
Moreover, before issuing the license for Post Falls Dam, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) was required to find that the licensed operations are not “inconsistent with
the purpose for which such reservation was created.” 16 U.S.C. § 797(e). The FERC so found,
stating that the Tribe “raised no objection to the fact that the project reservoir, Coeur d’Alene
Lake, occupies part of the reservation,” and citing the lack of “any evidence that relicensing the
Post Falls development as part of the Spokane River Project would adversely affect the
reservation.” Order, 127 FERC at ¶ 62,169. The fact that the United States and the Tribe
request that any lake level water right be deferred for the term of the current 50-year FERC
license demonstrates their continuing agreement with FERC’s determination that fulfillment of
the Reservation’s purposes does not require that the natural hydrograph be maintained.
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E.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISALLOWED ALL INSTREAM FLOW CLAIMS
OUTSIDE THE CURRENT RESERVATION BOUNDARIES.
The Claimants invite the Court to craft an entirely new category of reserved water rights,

namely a water right to protect fish habitat many miles distant from the Reservation if fish in
such stream eventually reach the Tribe’s portion of Coeur d’Alene Lake, where the Tribe retains
an implied fishing right. R. 0010. The extraordinary nature of the claim cannot be understated,
for implied rights outside reservation boundaries are generally precluded. This is so because
both tribes and tribal members “going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held
subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.”
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). An exception to this general
rule exists only when “there is express federal law to the contrary.” Id. (emphasis added). Here,
all parties admit there is no express reservation of water rights outside the reservation, indeed, in
the various agreements with the Tribe, there is no reservation of any off-reservation rights. For
such reason, the Claimants attempt to portray their claimed water right as necessary to the
exercise of on-reservation fishing rights. The assertion that an instream flow water right applies
wherever fish subject to an on-reservation fishing right may travel has no precedent in the law.
Reserved water rights are appurtenant to land, not to fish. Moreover, the Claimants’ attempt to
relate the off-reservation claims to the exercise of on-reservation fishing rights fails, because the
place of use for the claimed rights is outside the reservation—the claims seek water to protect
fish habitat in situ.
The district court’s disallowal of all instream flow claims outside the current Reservation
must be upheld for the following reasons: (1) water rights are reserved by implication only when
the subject waterway is within or bordering the reservation; (2) the Tribe’s cession of all right,
title, and interest to lands outside the current Reservation included all right, title, and interest in
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waterways; and (3) Congress, by returning ceded lands to the public domain, expressed its intent
that uses of water thereon would be appropriated only in accordance with state law.
1. The Claimants assert, correctly, that the term “appurtenant,” as applied to water rights
generally, does not require that the water source be physically located on or adjacent to the
appropriator’s land. Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 12-13, 156 P.2d 502,
513-14 (2007). But, rights incidental to the setting aside of lands for a tribe’s exclusive use are
different: “it is manifest” that rights implied from the reservation of land for a tribe’s use do “not
exist independently of the reservation itself.” Oregon Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath
Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 765-68 (1985) (discussing “appurtenant” hunting and fishing rights).
The 1873 Executive Order “set apart” a specific tract of land “as a reservation for the Coeur
d’Alene Indians.” R. 2031. Any incidental rights created by the Executive Order are confined to
such tract of land and do not exist independently of such land.
The restriction of reserved water rights to water sources that have a physical connection
with a reservation of land is a constant thread in reserved rights decisions. The first case to
confirm the federal government’s authority to reserve waters was United States v. The Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). There, the Court held that a state, through
adoption of the prior appropriation doctrine, could not “destroy the right of the United States, as
the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters.” Id. at 703. Next,
in Winters, the Court, citing Rio Grande, concluded that the United States reserved the right to
use water from the Milk River only after noting that the Reservation’s boundary went to the
middle of the River. 207 U.S. at 565. Other courts followed suit: in Conrad Inv. Co. v. United
States, 161 F. 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1908), the court found Winters to be applicable only because the
reservation boundary, as in Winters, went to the middle of the river; in United States v. Ahtanum
Irng. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), the court found a reserved water right to divert water
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from Ahtanum Creek, which formed a boundary of the Yakima Reservation, only after applying
the common law rule that “a tract of land bounded by a nonnavigable stream is deemed to extend
to the middle of the stream.” Id. at 325; see also City of Pocatello v. State, 145 Idaho 497, 503,
180 P.3d. 1048, 1054 (2008) (only restrictions on state control of water are “reserved rights on
federal government property and navigation servitude”).
In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the district
court’s holding that “the President, in setting aside a national monument, had “reserved
appurtenant, unappropriated water necessary to the purpose of the reservation.” Id. at 136. The
Court’s use of the term “appurtenant,” however, was not meant to affirm federal authority to
reserve waters not physically attached to the reservation: the district court had held that the
President had withdrawn from private appropriation only those unappropriated waters “in, on,
under and appurtenant to Devil's Hole [National Monument].” United States v. Cappaert, 375 F.
Supp. 456, 460 (D. Nev. 1974). The use of the conjunctive “and” indicates the court’s
understanding that “appurtenance” is an additional requirement for implied reservation of water,
not a substitute for physical attachment.
The Cappaert court’s enjoining of a water use over two miles distant from the reservation
does not suggest that the reserved water right extended off the reservation: the Court did nothing
more than apply conjunctive management principles in holding that a junior-priority offreservation groundwater user could be restricted when necessary to fulfill an on-reservation,
senior priority water right. Id. Moreover, the Claimant’s citation of Cappaert as analogous to
the present off-reservation claims is severely misplaced because, as discussed supra, the
Claimants do not seek to enjoin off-reservation water users “to serve on-reservation uses of
water.” U.S. Brief at 37. Rather, the express purpose of the claims is to preserve off-reservation
instream habitat. A necessary prerequisite to such off-reservation use is proof of either tribal
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ownership of such habitat, or reservation of the right to use, control and protect off-reservation
habitat. The Claimants have shown proof of neither. Cf. Joyce, 144 Idaho at 512-13
(recognizing right to use water source not located on rancher’s property when rancher had legal
right, in form of grazing permit, to use federal property on which water source was located).
The limitation of implied reserved water rights to waters in, on, under, and appurtenant to
a reservation of land was also recognized in Agua Caliente Band, 849 F.3d at 1270, which held
that “the Winters doctrine . . . only reserves water if it is appurtenant to the withdrawn land,” and
then found that “[a]ppurtenance . . . simply limits the reserved right to those waters which are
attached to the reservation.” Id. at 1268, 1271. The court found such attachment to exist
because the aquifer “clearly underlies the Tribe's reservation. Id. at 1271 n.10. 8
The Claimants err in asserting that the holdings in Arizona v. California, Kittitas
Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985), and Dep’t. of
Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrig. Dist. (also known as the Acquavella Adjudication) all
recognized off-reservation water rights. The assertion that the Arizona v. California decree
awarded water rights to the Cocopah Reservation for lands two miles from the Colorado River
ignores the history of the Cocopah Reservation. The Cocopah Reservation was created by
8

In an earlier case, John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1229-30, (9th Cir. 2013), the
court held that the term “appurtenant,” as used in reserved water right cases, “refer[s] not to
some physical attachment of water to land, but to the legal doctrine that attaches water rights to
land to the extent necessary to fulfill reservation purposes.” John did not involve water rights:
the plaintiffs in John challenged the validity of a federal regulation that defined the scope of
“public lands” in Alaska to include appurtenant reserved water rights. While the Court did not
interpret appurtenancy to mean physical attachment, as it later did in Agua Caliente, it approved
the agencies’ determination that under the reserved water rights doctrine “appurtenant” waters
“included waters within and ‘immediately adjacent to’ federal reservations, but not . . . waters
upstream and downstream from those reservations.” Id. at 1241. The Agua Caliente court
apparently did not view John as providing any meaningful guidance as to the meaning of
“appurtenant,” since it failed to cite it.
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executive order in 1917, and the lots reserved in the executive order were “bordered on the west
by the meander line of the Colorado River as shown by a public land survey made in 1874.” R.
2938 (Solicitor Opinion); R. 3495 (plat showing Reservation bordering Colorado River meander
line). Between the time of the 1874 survey and the 1917 executive order, accretion had shifted
the Colorado River to the West, “leaving a considerable amount of accreted land between the
river and [the Reservation boundary].” R. 2938. A dispute later arose regarding whether such
accretion became part of the Reservation. R. 2938-2941 (the Solicitor eventually concluded that
it was). Regardless of the status of the accretion, the Reservation was bounded by the Colorado
River as surveyed so that the reservation of implied water rights from the River is consistent with
the principle that reserved water rights are limited to waterways physically attached to the
Reservation.
In Kittitas Reclamation Dist., the court made no determination of reserved water rights—
indeed, it made no mention of Winters or other reserved water right cases. Rather, the only issue
before the court was whether a federal district court had exceeded the scope of its retained
jurisdiction under a prior consent decree when it ordered the temporary release of water from a
federal irrigation project to protect 60 salmon redds that would have otherwise been exposed and
destroyed. 763 F.2d at 1033-34. The release was upheld as a “reasonable emergency
measure[].” Id. at 1035. No off-reservation water rights were awarded or recognized.
In Dep’t of Ecology, the issue of entitlement to off-reservation instream flows was never
in dispute: on appeal, the Washington Supreme Court noted that:
The question in this appeal is not whether the Indians have treaty rights to water
from the Yakima River and its tributaries, but rather the quantity of water the
Indians are entitled to and the priority date attaching to such quantity.
Dep’t. of Ecology, 850 P.2d at 1309. Later in the opinion, the court again noted that:
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All of the parties to this litigation agree that the Yakima Indians are entitled to
water for irrigation purposes, and, at least at one time, were entitled to water for
the preservation of fishing rights. The disagreement here is the extent of the
treaty rights remaining.
Id. at 317. Because the Washington courts simply incorporated the parties’ agreement regarding
entitlement to off-reservation water rights, the Dep’t of Ecology decision has no value as
precedent. See Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 991
(Wash. 1994) (“[i]n cases where a legal theory is not discussed in the opinion, that case is not
controlling on a future case where the legal theory is properly raised”).
2. Even if this Court were to ignore precedent limiting the implied-reservation-of-water
doctrine to waters physically attached to a reservation of land, it still could not imply an intent by
the President to reserve, in the 1873 Executive Order, all off-reservation waters in the Coeur
d’Alene and Spokane River basins. First, such a reservation would be inconsistent with the
express language of the Order, which, by its terms, delimited a “tract of country” to be
“withdrawn from sale and set apart as a reservation for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.” R. 2031.
By withdrawing a specific tract of land, the natural implication is that no rights are reserved
except within such tract. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 357-58 (1941)
(creation of executive order reservation at tribe’s request “and its acceptance by them amounted
to a relinquishment of any tribal claims to lands which they might have had outside that
reservation”).
The holding in Santa Fe is, if anything, bolstered in the case of the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation by the terms of the unratified 1873 Agreement, which, while unenforceable, does
demonstrate the Tribe’s acceptance of the 1873 Reservation and the Tribe’s accompanying intent
to relinquish all rights outside such Reservation. In such Agreement the Tribe agreed to
“relinquish to the government of the United States all their right and title in and to all the lands
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heretofore claimed by them, and lying and being outside of said described reservation.” R. 3674.
An intent to reserve water rights on lands outside the Reservation can hardly be ascribed to a
cession of all “right and title” to those same lands. Nor can the Tribe assert that it did not
understand waterways to be included in its cession of “lands,” because its Reservation was
described as consisting of “all and singular the lands and privileges lying and being within” the
described limits of the reservation. R. 3673. If the Tribe understood the reservation of “lands”
to include waterways, it necessarily understood its cession of lands to likewise include
waterways. 9 As the district court concluded, this interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the
unratified agreement would have included a provision “that the waters running into said
reservation shall not be turned from their natural channel where they enter such reservation.” R.
3673. Such a provision, by its terms, reflects the parties’ understanding that, if the Agreement
was ratified, any limitation on diversion of waters would be limited to waters “where they enter
such reservation.”
3. Another reason to deny the off-reservation claims is the general principle that the
Tribe’s property interest in fish present in the Tribe’s portion of Coeur d’Alene Lake ceases once
those fish leave tribal property. The Tribe’s ownership of lands includes the power to protect
and regulate the taking of wildlife while present on tribal land. New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983) (addressing reservation never opened to non-Indian
ownership). Likewise, “[o]wnership of submerged lands [includes] the power to control
navigation, fishing, and other public uses of water.” United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5
(1997). But ownership of submerged lands does not provide the Tribe a property right or other

9

The Tribe’s understanding that the cession included waterways is also demonstrated by
the fact that the ceded “lands” were described, in part, as going to the “foot of Pen de’Oreille
Lake; thence up said lake to the summit of the Bitter Root mountains.” R. 3674.
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legal interest that follows the fish once they leave the Lake to spawn in tributary streams. The
Tribe’s right to protect the fish from exploitation or harm ceases once those fish are no longer on
tribal property. This principle is embodied in cases addressing tribal authority to prevent the
taking of wildlife on non-Indian lands—the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that wildlife on
non-Indian lands, even within reservations, is beyond tribal protection. Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) (tribe has power to regulate hunting and fishing only on land
belonging to the tribe); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1993) (conveyance of
reservation lands to non-Indians implies the loss of right to prevent hunting and fishing). If a
tribe cannot protect fish and game on fee lands within reservation boundaries, it necessarily
follows that a tribe cannot claim the right to protect fish or fish habitat outside the reservation
absent an express act of Congress providing otherwise. 10
In short, as a matter of law, the Tribe has no property right in fish once they leave
waterways owned by the Tribe; the Tribe has no right to prevent the taking of fish once they
leave waters owned by the Tribe; and the Tribe has reserved no property rights in fish habitat
outside Reservation boundaries. Because fish outside the Reservation are outside the ownership
and control of the Tribe, no purposes exist for which instream Winters rights may be implied—
the situation is no different than that which exists when lands suitable for irrigation are conveyed
to a non-Indian: once “land has been removed from the Tribe’s possession and conveyed to a
homesteader, the purposes for which Winters rights were implied are eliminated.” United States
v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1984). Outside the Reservation, neither the land, the

10

See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1412 (holding that instream flows implied from setting aside of
lands for primary purpose of fishing survived termination of tribal ownership because
congressional act, in addition to preserving right to hunt and fish on former reservation lands,
provided that termination would not “abrogate any water rights of the tribe and its members”).
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waterways, nor the fish are in tribal possession—absent possession of at least one of the three, no
reserved water rights for fish habitat can be implied.
4. Even if legal precedent existed for recognition of off-reservation water rights, such
rights could not be implied in light of the Tribe’s express cession of all right, title, interest and
claim to lands outside the current Reservation. In 1886, Congress authorized negotiations with
the Tribe “for the cession of their lands outside the limits of the present [i.e., 1873] Coeur
d’Alene reservation.” Act of May 15, 1886, 24 Stat. 29, 44. In the agreement reached on March
26, 1887, the Tribe, in return for a set payment of $150,000 and other consideration, agreed to
“cede, grant, relinquish, and quitclaim to the United States all right, title, and claim which they
now have, or ever had, to all lands in said Territories and elsewhere, except the portion of land
within the boundaries of their present reservation . . . .” Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989,
1027.
When the 1887 Agreement was presented to Congress for ratification, Congress declined
to do so, and instead directed the formation of a new commission to negotiate “for the purchase
and release by said tribe of such portions of its reservation not agricultural and valuable chiefly
for minerals and timber as such tribe shall consent to sell.” Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 980,
1002. The new commission sent to negotiate with the Tribe was specifically directed to a Senate
resolution calling for the release of navigable waters from the Reservation. State Ex. 7 at 483.
See also United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d at 1078 (“Congress . . . authoriz[ed] negotiations for
cession of whatever portion of the Tribe’s submerged lands it was willing to sell”).
In negotiations occurring in 1889, the Tribe agreed to “cede, grant, relinquish, and
quitclaim to the United States all the right, title, and claim which they now have, or ever had,” to
“the northern portion of the [1873] reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake
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Coeur d’Alene, in exchange for $500,000." Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 269-70. The
1887 and 1889 Agreements were ratified together in the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1027.
It is well-established that a tribe’s cession of all right, title and interest to “lands,”
especially when coupled with monetary payment, includes not only bare title to the land, but all
incidents of title as well. In Oregon Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, the Court concluded that a tribe’s
“general conveyance” of all “right, title and claim” to lands in a described area “unquestionably
carried with it whatever special hunting and fishing right the Indians previously possessed.” 473
U.S. at 766. In Western Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1991),
the Ninth Circuit concluded that an “unqualified transfer of title includes a transfer of hunting
and fishing rights.” See also United States v. Washington, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1201 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) (“[t]he extinguishment of aboriginal title extinguishes all incidents of aboriginal
title . . . unless expressly reserved by treaty or federal law”); Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 462 (7th Cir. 1998) (“the creation and acceptance of an
Indian reservation by treaty constitutes a relinquishment of aboriginal rights to lands outside the
reservation . . . including aboriginal rights in land or water not specifically mentioned in any
treaty . . . .”).
In short, case law establishes overwhelmingly that a cession of “land” includes all
incidental property rights and all right to use natural resources in the ceded area, unless the
cession agreement, or a related treaty, agreement, or statute, segregated such rights from land
ownership and reserved them explicitly. See. e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 201-02 (1999) (Tribe’s cession of “all right, title and interest . . . to any
other lands in the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere” did not cede hunting rights reserved in an
earlier treaty because “the Chippewa’s usufructuary rights,” having been explicitly reserved on
earlier-ceded lands, “existed independently of land ownership” and would not have been

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO
DOCKET NO. 45383-2017

Page 31

understood to be included in a cession of “land”); Adair, 723 F.2d at 1412 (congressional
termination of Tribe’s title to lands within former reservation did not extinguish fishing rights
and water rights implied to protect fish habitat given statutory language providing that
termination would not “abrogate any water rights of the tribe”).
Here, nothing in the ratified agreements with the Tribe explicitly segregated and reserved
fish habitat and associated water rights in the territories ceded by the Tribe. As was true for the
1873 unratified cession agreement discussed supra, the Tribe agreed in the 1887 Agreement to
cede “all lands in said Territories and elsewhere except the portion of land within the boundaries
of their present reservation.” 26 Stat. at 1027. Tribal negotiators consistently referred to the
Reservation as consisting of “lands.” 11 If the parties understood the reservation of “land” to
include water rights, then the cession of land in the same document must likewise include water
rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court reached this exact conclusion in Idaho v. United States, which
found that the Tribe’s 1889 cession of all right, title and interest to a specified portion of its
reservation “include[ed] approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene.” 533 U.S. at 269-70.
Clearly, the Court understood the Tribe’s cession to include not only land, but waters. This fact
is reflected in the United States’ claims, which do not claim water rights for the ceded portion of
the Lake. R. 6278 (Notice of Claim No. 95-16704). If, as is admitted by the United States, it
cannot claim water on the ceded portion of the Lake, then its claims for water rights on other
ceded waterways must likewise be disallowed.

11

R. 2115 (“Saltice. . . . I, as an Indian, like my land; am very anxious to have land; I do
not care about money. You three gentlemen came today to have an understanding about part of
our land. My heart has been troubled, for three or four days, but now it is all right, because I
know this land is my property.”); R. 2116 (“Saltise. You say we have a great deal of land. If we
wanted to let it go for money we would say, take more, but we do not care for money; it is land
we want. When the other treaty [the 1887 Agreement] is ratified we will have land to sell”).
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5. Even if the Court were to conclude that the Tribe did not intend its cession of lands in
the 1887 and 1889 to include water rights, it must still uphold the disallowal of all claims on
ceded lands, because regardless of tribal intent, Congress, in ratifying the 1887 and 1889
agreements, took the additional and conclusive step of directing that “all lands so sold and
released to the United States . . . shall, on the passage of this act, be restored to the public
domain, and shall be disposed of by the United States to actual settlers only, under the provisions
of the homestead law.” 26 Stat. at 1031. Congress’ restoration of the lands to the public domain
is dispositive: once the ceded lands were returned to the public domain, they became subject to a
series of congressional acts requiring that waters on public domain lands be available for private
appropriation without restriction. While such statutes do not apply to water rights whose place
of use is within an Indian reservation, they do apply where, as here, the place of use is outside
the reservation, unless Congress took action to reserve water rights for the Tribe on public
domain lands in language equally explicit to the language reserving such waters for private
appropriations. It did not.
The first of these acts, the Mining Act of 1866, opened public domain lands to
exploration and development by miners. Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 253. Recognizing that
local laws and customs had arisen to allocate the use of waters for mining, Congress declared
that uses developed under local laws were to be maintained and protected:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the
same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the
decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same . . . .
Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 253 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661).
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Four years later Congress amended the Mining Act of 1866 to include placer mines, and
reaffirmed that water rights obtained under applicable state or local laws were not to be affected
by grant of federal patents:
[A]ll patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to
any vested and accrued water rights, or right to ditches and reservoirs used in
connection with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or
recognized by [the 1866 Act].
Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661).
In 1877, Congress passed a third statute, the Desert Lands Act, to permit persons in most
western states to enter and claim irrigable lands “by conducting water upon the same” in an
amount not to “exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the
purpose of irrigation and reclamation.” Act of March 3, 1877, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 321). Congress went on to provide that:
[A]ll surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together
with the water from all lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the
public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation
and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to
existing rights.
Id. The Supreme Court has held that the three acts recognized and affirmed not only those water
rights vested at the times of the acts’ passage, but also all future water rights appropriated under
state law:
[The Acts of 1866 and 1870 were] not limited to rights acquired before 1866.
They reach into the future as well, and approve and confirm the policy of
appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and
the legislation and judicial decisions of the arid land states, as the test and
measure of private rights in and to the nonnavigable waters on the public domain.
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155 (1935). The
Court went on to conclude that the Desert Lands Act reserved all waters on the public domain for
private appropriation:
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Congress intended . . . that all nonnavigable waters [on the public domain] should
be reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories
named. The words that the water of all sources of water supply upon the public
lands and not navigable “shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and
use of the public” are not susceptible of any other construction.
Id. at 162.
Thus, when Congress, in the 1891 Act, returned all lands ceded by the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe to the public domain, those lands became subject to the directive in the 1877 Desert Lands
Act that all sources of waters in the ceded territory were to be “held free for the appropriation
and use of the public.” 43 U.S.C. § 321. The Tribe’s suggestion that the Tribe believed it had
reserved off-reservation water rights (despite its explicit cession of all “right, title and claim”) is
not sufficient to overcome the explicit language of the 1891 Act: rights are not reserved to a tribe
“merely because they thought so.” Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S.
169, 180 (1947). Signatory Indians are “bound by the plain import of the language of the act and
the agreement,” even if they later assert “that they did not so understand the act.” United States
v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1913). Put another way, a
tribe’s “understanding [cannot] be imputed to Congress in the face of plain language”
establishing congressional intent. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians, 330 U.S. at 179.
F.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE PRIORITY DATE OF
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS APPURTENANT TO RESERVATION LANDS ALIENATED BY
THE UNITED STATES, THEN LATER REACQUIRED AND RESTORED TO TRUST STATUS,
SHOULD BE THE DATE OF REACQUISITION OR THE DATE WATER RIGHTS WERE
ESTABLISHED UNDER STATE LAW.
1.

Purposes Implied by the Setting Aside of Lands for a Tribe’s Exclusive Use
Cease to Apply When Reservation Lands are Conveyed to Non-Indians.

The United States claims a priority date of November 8, 1873, for its irrigation and
DCMI claims, and a priority date of “time immemorial” for its non-consumptive claims
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(instream flows, springs, seeps, wetlands, and lake level maintenance). The claimed priority
dates ignore the fact that many of the claimed water rights are for places of use that have not
been in continuous federal ownership since the creation of the Reservation. The Government, in
1906, allotted to each tribal member 160 acres of land to be held for the sole use and benefit of
the individual tribal member. Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325, 335. The remaining lands,
which formed the majority of the Reservation, were opened to non-Indian homesteading. 34
Stat. at 326. In the following decades, another 40,000 acres were conveyed to non-Indians as
allottees sold their allotments or lost them due to mortgage foreclosures. R. 2244-50. By the
early part of the 20th Century, non-Indian lands within the Reservation, “far exceeded Indian
holdings.” U.S. Brief at 7 (emphasis in original)
As time went on, a small portion of the lands within the Reservation were reacquired by
the Tribe—once those lands are taken into trust by the United States they are once again
“reserved” for the Tribe’s exclusive use. Reacquired property consists of either: (1) allotments
that were sold to non-Indians, or (2) former homesteads. 12
If a non-Indian purchases a former allotment, he or she may acquire the allottee’s share of
the Tribe’s reserved irrigation water right, if such water is put to use “with reasonable diligence
after the passage of title.” Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir.
1981). Such rights are typically referred to as “Walton rights.” 13 Walton rights have a date of

12

In 1958, 12,877.65 acres of land that were made available for sale, but never sold, were
“restored to tribal ownership.” Act of May 19, 1958, 72 Stat. 121. Those lands never left federal
ownership and thus retain their original date-of-reservation priority date. Anderson, 736 F.2d at
1361.
13
“Walton” rights are measured by the amount of water the allottee was using, along with
water to irrigate any additional acreage the non-Indian purchaser established with reasonable
diligence after acquisition. 647 F.2d at 51.
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reservation priority date, which applies upon re-acquisition by the Tribe. United States v.
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984).
Different rules apply to homesteaded lands. Once reservation land is “conveyed to a
homesteader, the purposes for which Winters rights were implied are eliminated.” Anderson,
736 F.2d at 1363. Thus, the homesteader does not acquire a share of the Tribe’s reserved water
rights; any water rights for homesteaded land must be acquired, and retained, under state law. Id.
Upon reacquisition by the Tribe, the priority date is the date a water right (if any) was perfected
under state law, unless lost to non-use:
It is a basic tenent [sic] of western water law that water rights perfected through
appropriation and not subsequently lost to nonuse or abandonment will generally
pass with transfer of title to real property and will carry a priority date as of their
original application to beneficial use. We see no reason to depart from this rule as
to the perfected water rights of homesteaders on reacquisition of the property by
the Tribe. As to lands in this category, state law determines the priority date.
Where the homesteader has no perfected water rights or has lost rights which
were perfected, there are no rights to be regained by the Indians on reacquisition
of the property.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363.
The principle underlying the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding consumptive water rights
on reacquired lands is that the Tribe acquires only those water rights that the non-Indian seller is
able to convey. If additional water rights are necessary to achieve the purposes for which the
land was reacquired, the reacquired lands is treated “in a manner analogous to that of a newly
created federal reservation and . . . the purposes for which Winters rights are implied arise at the
time of reacquisition by the Tribe.” Id.
The district court correctly applied these principles in holding that a non-Indian seller
could not convey non-consumptive water rights to the Tribe because:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO
DOCKET NO. 45383-2017

Page 37

[N]on-Indian successors cannot hold, appropriate or exercise non-diversionary or
instream rights, except for stockwater. As a result, to the extent such rights are
non-diversionary or are for instream purposes, such rights would be lost through
non-use. Springs and wetlands as well as other rights lost to non-use would carry
a date of reacquisition priority date.
R. 4474.
The Claimants seek to avoid Anderson’s holding that the tribe only acquires those water
rights held by the non-Indian seller by crafting an entirely new, and henceforth unrecognized,
category of reserved water rights, namely water rights that “have remained dormant during the
period of non-tribal ownership.” U.S. Brief at 40. Because the water rights are asserted to be
dormant, rather than extinguished, the United States asserts that “once back in tribal hands” nonconsumptive water rights “maintain their original priority date.” Id.
The Claimants’ theory of “dormant” reserved rights is not grounded in Anderson, which
held that the only water rights “regained” upon reacquisition are those held by the non-Indian
seller. 736 F.2d at 1363. Nor does the United States’ theory of water rights that remain dormant,
rather than lost, upon sale of land to non-Indians, have any basis in general Indian law principles.
Courts typically describe rights incidental to ownership of tribal property as being “lost,”
“excluded,” or “eliminated” upon conveyance of reservation lands in fee to non-Indians. See
e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993) (surveying earlier cases, and finding
that Crow Tribe, as confirmed in Montana, 450 U.S. at 559, had “lost the right of absolute use
and occupation of lands so conveyed [and] the incidental power to regulate the use of the lands
by non-Indians”) (emphasis added); Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff
tribe’s fishing rights could not be exercised on non-Indian lands because the United States, in
giving non-Indians fee title, “excluded the interests asserted by the plaintiffs”) (emphasis added);
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363 (where the land has been removed from the Tribe’s possession and
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conveyed to a homesteader, the purposes for which Winters rights were implied are eliminated”)
(emphasis added).
Moreover, the assertion that non-consumptive water rights should spring back into being
with their original, “time immemorial” priority date misrepresents the nature and origin of the
“time immemorial” principle. In Adair, the court concluded that a hunting and fishing water
right had a “time immemorial” priority date because “uninterrupted use and occupation of land
and water created in the Tribe aboriginal or ‘Indian title’ to all of its vast holdings.” 723 F.2d at
1413 (emphasis added). The court concluded that an “important purpose of the [1864 Klamath]
treaty was to guarantee continuity of the Indians’ hunting and gathering lifestyle.” Id. at 1409
(emphasis added). Thus, the 1864 Treaty was a “recognition of the Tribe’s aboriginal water
rights and a confirmation to the Tribe of a continued water right to support its hunting and
fishing lifestyle on the Klamath Reservation.” Id. at 1414 (emphasis added). In short, the time
immemorial water right was based on continuous and uninterrupted use that predated the
reservation and was confirmed by, rather than created by, the federal action reserving the lands.
Id. (time immemorial water rights “were not created by the 1864 Treaty, rather, the treaty
confirmed the continued existence of these rights”).
But when a tribe reacquires lands, its use of the land and the water, whether consumptive
or non-consumptive, is no longer continuous due to the intervening non-Indian ownership. Upon
reacquisition, any water rights necessary for use of the reacquired property, unless regained from
the non-Indian seller, must be treated as “new” rights, because such rights would not exist absent
reacquisition. As explained in Anderson, “[t]his principle protects the intervening rights, if any,
that may have been acquired in good faith by third party water users . . . prior to reacquisition by
the Tribe.” 736 F.2d at 1363. Such concern for vested water rights applies whether the claim is
for consumptive or non-consumptive uses. In both cases, the district court properly applied
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Anderson’s admonishment to “treat these lands in a manner analogous to that of a newly created
federal reservation and find that the purposes for which Winters rights are implied arise at the
time of reacquisition by the Tribe.” Id.
In addition to their theory of “dormant” reserved rights, the Claimants attempt to
circumvent the Anderson holdings by asserting that non-consumptive reserved water rights are
not affected by, and can be claimed on, allotments and homesteads sold to non-Indians. Tribe’s
Brief at 53; U.S. Brief at 41 This assertion cannot be reconciled with the claims themselves,
which limit claims for non-consumptive water rights for springs, seeps, and wetlands to “Tribal
lands within the Reservation.” R. 0011. This limitation in the claims demonstrates the United
States’ own determination that non-consumptive water rights cannot be claimed when the place
of use is on non-Indian lands.
Ignoring the conflict with their own claims, the United States and the Tribe rely on a
statement in the Walton litigation addressing a reserved water right to support natural spawning
of fish in No Name Creek on the Colville Reservation. U.S. Brief at 41; Tribe’s Brief at 53.
Walton did not establish a minimum stream flow over and across both tribal and non-tribal
property; rather, the court awarded the Tribe a water right of 350 acre feet per year to support
fish spawning on tribal property. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 405 (9th
Cir. 1985); see also Walton, 647 F.2d at 45 (“[t]he Indians cultivated No Name Creek's lower
reach to establish spawning grounds”). Under such circumstances, the court held that the
“quantity of water” awarded to the Tribe to support fish spawning on tribal lands was “not
affected by the allotment of reservation lands and passage of title out of the Indians’ hands.” 752
F.2d at 400 (emphasis added). The court therefore rejected the district court’s reduction of the
fish spawning water right to 187.2 acre feet per year, a figure the district court arrived at by
subtracting irrigation water rights for tribal and non-tribal lands from the 1,000 acre feet per year
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estimated to be available in the No Name water system. Id. at 404. Instead, the Ninth Circuit
ordered that the court award “120 acre feet per year to Walton; 666.4 to the Indian allottees; and
350 to the Tribe's fishery.” Id. at 405. Since this exceeded the 1,000 acre feet of water available,
and “all parties have a priority date as of the creation of the Reservation, each should bear a
proportionate share of any adjustment required by shortages of water.” Id.
In short, Walton’s statement that the quantity of a non-consumptive water right awarded
to the Tribe for use on its lands was not affected by the passage of several allotments to a nonIndian does not recognize a tribal right to retain and hold non-consumptive water rights on nonIndian lands. Thus, Walton provides no support for Claimant’s assertion that non-consumptive
water rights on reacquired lands retain their original priority date upon reacquisition of title.
2.

The Big Horn Approach to Water Rights on Reacquired Lands is Consistent
with Anderson.

The Claimants suggest that the district court erred in relying on the Anderson decision
regarding priority dates on reacquired lands, citing the holding in the Big Horn Adjudication.
Tribe Brief at 50, U.S. Brief at 40 n.17. The Big Horn court only addressed water rights on
reacquired lands originally held by “an Indian allottee,” 753 P.2d at 114, and had no occasion to
apply, or even discuss, Anderson’s holding that once reservation lands are homesteaded, the
“purposes for which Winters rights were implied are eliminated.” Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363.
Thus, Big Horn leaves intact Anderson’s holding that on reacquired homestead lands, the priority
date is the date of reacquisition, unless the non-Indian predecessor had perfected a water right
under state law, in which case the tribe acquires the state law priority date. Id. Indeed, the Big
Horn court cited with approval the Anderson district court holding that “[i]mplied water rights on
Indian reservations . . . are extinguished by acts of Congress inconsistent with recognition of
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their existence.” 753 P.2d at 133 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
Wash. 1982).
Moreover, in addressing the priority date for reacquired allotments, the Big Horn court
did not distinguish Anderson, but simply assumed that the non-Indian purchasers had acquired a
date-of-reservation priority water right from the Indian allottee. See 753 P.2d at 114 (holding
that reacquired lands have a date of reservation priority date because “[w]e have already held
that a non-Indian purchaser from an Indian allottee obtains a reserved water right with a treaty
priority date, and that his non-Indian successor would likewise succeed to the treaty priority
date” and there is “no reason then to deny the same priority to an Indian or tribal purchaser”); cf.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362 (upon reacquisition of allotment, Tribe acquires allottee’s original,
date-of-reservation priority date, unless lost through nonuse by subsequent owners). Thus, the
Big Horn court did not craft a rule different than that applied by the Ninth Circuit; indeed, it
explicitly applied the holding in Walton, id. at 112-13, and simply left unaddressed reacquisitions
of land where non-Indian purchasers failed to acquire and hold water rights from allottees. See
Walton, 647 F.2d. at 51 (once acquired by a non-Indian, allotment water right is subject to state
laws providing for forfeiture of water rights for non-use).
III.
CONCLUSION
The State requests that the Court uphold the disallowal of claims as provided in the Order
on Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 4310), Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use (R.
4301) and Final Order Disallowing Water Right Claims (R. 4305), as modified in the Amended
Final Order Disallowing Water Right Claims (R. 4468), Order on Motion to Set Aside and
Modify (R. 4479), and Order Granting Motion to Reconsider (R. 4473).
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